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Abstract We study Sender-optimal signaling equilibria with cheap talk and money-
burning. Under general assumptions, the Sender never uses money-burning to reveal
all states, but alwayswants to garble information for at least some states.With quadratic
preferences and any log-concave density of the states, optimal communication is gar-
bled for all states: money-burning, if used at all, is used to adjust pooling intervals.
This is illustrated by studying in depth the well-known uniform-quadratic case. We
also show how the presence of a cost of being “caught unprepared” that gives rise to
a small change in a common assumption on the Receiver’s utility function makes full
revelation through money-burning Sender-optimal.
Keywords Cheap talk · Money burning · Persuasion · Optimal equilibrium
JEL Classification D82
1 Introduction
There are many situations in which decision makers lack relevant information, while
those that possess the information have a biased interest in the decision that must be
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taken. DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) provide numerous examples where informed
parties, like sellers or lobbyists, try to influence uninformed parties, e.g., consumers
or politicians. In such situations, what is the optimal strategy of the informed party,
the Sender, to influence the decision-maker, the Receiver? We study how a Sender
makes optimal use of two common instruments—cheap talk and money burning—to
influence a Receiver.
Money burning is a common euphemism for self-imposed losses in utility, see, e.g.,
Austen-Smith and Banks (2000). An often cited example of money burning is brand
advertising as the content of the advertisement is less important than the fact that
money was spent on it.1 However, as losses are self-imposed, money burning is also
readily accessible in many other social situations, e.g., when a lobbyist goes out of
his way to reach a member of parliament or when a political prisoner goes on hunger
strike to show his commitment to a cause.2
We conduct our analysis in the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982), CS
from now on, augmented with money burning. The resulting model was first studied
by Austen-Smith and Banks (2000), ASB from now on. ASB show that the option to
burn money expands the set of equilibria enormously and makes, e.g., full revelation a
possible equilibrium outcome. We proceed further and establish which equilibrium is
best, in expected terms, from the Sender’s perspective.3 In particular, we address the
following issues. Under what conditions is it optimal for the Sender to burn money
to fully reveal all her private information about the state? Under what conditions is it
optimal to fully reveal a particular interval of states? Can it be optimal for the Sender
to rely exclusively on cheap talk, and not to use any money burning at all? How does
the use of money burning relate to the degree of conflict between the Sender and the
Receiver?
Our main results are as follows. Suppose we have an equilibrium in which the
Sender separates states in an interval. We derive a condition such that, if satisfied,
we can construct another equilibrium in which the Sender pools some of the states in
that interval and that gives him a higher expected utility. Two results follow immedi-
ately. First, although money burning makes perfect separation feasible, as is shown
in ASB and Kartik 2007, we show it is never optimal for the Sender. Because of the
misalignment between the Sender and the Receiver, separation requires increasing
amounts of money burning. Irrespective of the Sender’s utility function and the state
distribution, the Sender benefits from garbling information for at least some states.
The second result is that in a large class of models, including models with preferences
represented by quadratic loss functions in combination with any density of the states
that is log-concave, the Sender does not use money burning to separate an interval
of states.4 That is, in this class of models, adding money burning as an instrument of
communication does not lead the Sender to reveal any state precisely. Communication
is garbled for all states. In other words, to the extent that a lobbyist can choose her
1 See, e.g., Froeb et al. (2014).
2 Other examples can be found in Austen-Smith and Banks (2002).
3 ASB study some welfare results for the uniform-quadratic case. They show that burned money increases
the cheap talk communication precision for that case.
4 Many well-known densities are log-concave, see, e.g., Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005).
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lobbying strategy, the member of parliament cannot deduce the exact state from his
interaction with the lobbyist.
It then logically follows that, within that class, if money burning is used at all in
the optimal equilibrium, it is used (i) to re-arrange pooling intervals relative to what
they would have been in the absence of money burning, and possibly (ii) to include
one or more additional pooling intervals. To better understand the logic of these two
uses of money burning, we next focus on a well-known instance of a log-concave
density, the uniform density, and assume a quadratic loss function, as much theory
and applied work does. Recall that Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that if cheap talk
is the only instrument of communication, when the degree of conflict between Sender
and Receiver decreases, the quality of communication can increase. In particular, if
the degree of conflict drops below specific threshold levels, the maximum number
of distinct actions that the Sender can induce the Receiver to take through verbal
communication goes up by one.
We show that the Sender only burnsmoney if her degree of conflictwith theReceiver
is close to one of these threshold values. If it is just larger than such a threshold
value, burned money is particularly cost-effective in inducing the Receiver to take an
additional action, as a slight reduction in the degree of conflict would already have led
to an increase in the number of actions in the absence of money burning. That is, an
additional interval is injected into the equilibrium partition. If the degree of conflict
is just below a threshold value, it is not optimal to use money burning to increase the
number of actions that the Receiver wants to take. Instead, the Sender burns money to
induce the Receiver to better align his actions with her own interests. When the degree
of conflict decreases, optimal equilibria with and without money burning alternate.We
conjecture that this structure also holds for other log-concave densities. We conclude
by showing how a discontinuity in the Receiver’s utility function makes full revelation
through money burning the Sender’s optimal strategy.
In this paper we focus on Sender-optimal equilibria. We do so for a number of
reasons. It is a focal extremal point of the equilibrium set. The other focal extremal
point is the Receiver-optimal equilibrium. Clearly, from the Receiver’s perspective, a
perfectly separating equilibrium is optimal as he does not incur the costs of money
burning. Second, in the game that we study there is a channel for communication
directed from the Sender to the Receiver. If the Sender also uses this channel to
announce ex antewhat signaling strategy it will use, it is natural to focus on the Sender-
optimal equilibrium strategy. This requires only a moderate degree of commitment,
as the Sender only commits to play an equilibrium strategy, rather than possibly a
non-equilibrium strategy. Moreover, as we show towards the end of the paper, the
equilibrium signaling strategy that maximizes the sum of expected utilities of Sender
and Receiver is qualitatively similar to the one that is Sender-optimal. Finally, by
focusing on the signaling equilibrium strategy that is optimal from the informed party’s
perspective we can usefully contrast it with the screening equilibrium strategy that is
optimal from the uninformed party’s perspective and that has been studied in Krishna
and Morgan (2008). We discuss that paper in the next section.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature,
and Sect. 3 sets up the model which is analyzed in Sects. 4 and 5. Section 6 discusses
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when separation can be Sender-optimal. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A contains
all proofs.
2 Related literature
ASB is the seminal paper on signaling with cheap talk and money burning, and we
make use of one of its important finding: the set of states that give rise to a given action
is convex. The main contribution of ASB is to prove the existence of a special class of
equilibria in which money burning takes place. ASB establish that thanks to money
burning, one can “squeeze in separating segments at the far end of any… equilibrium
partition” of a game studied in CS in which the Sender can use only cheap talk (ASB,
p. 7). It then follows that full revelation is also an equilibrium outcome. Austen-
Smith and Banks (2002) study some welfare results for the uniform-quadratic case.
They establish that the Sender prefers the most-informative cheap talk equilibrium
over a fully separating equilibrium using money burning. We extent their results by
showing that, with general densities and preferences, the Sender never prefers using
money burning to fully separate, and by showing which equilibrium she prefers in the
uniform quadratic case.
For the model used in ASB, Kartik (2007) shows that cheap talk can be influential,
i.e., induce at least two different actions, with money burning if and only if it can be
influential without money burning. He also proves the conjecture stated in ASB that
if the amount of money the Sender can burn shrinks to zero, the set of equilibria with
burned money shrinks to the set of pure cheap talk equilibria.
Sender-optimal strategies have also been the focus in other contexts. Recently,
Rayo and Segal (2010) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) derived Sender-optimal
communication strategies when she can commit to truthfully reveal her private infor-
mation. This contrasts with our assumption that a Sender cannot commit to a strategy.
Like us, Eso˝ and Galambos (2013) study a Sender who has access to cheap talk and
a second means of communication. Whereas we study money burning as the second
means, they study the possibility making information hard at a cost that is independent
of the true state. In the presence of hard information, full revelation can only be an
equilibrium if disclosure costs equal zero, whereas full revelation always exists in case
of money burning.5
The Sender–Receiver problem has also been approached as a screening problem.
The focus has been on the uninformed principal offering a compensation contract
or a delegation contract.6 Ottaviani (2000) and Krishna and Morgan (2008) study
compensation contracts, in which the principal compensates the agent for information
5 Money burning, in combination with forward induction, has also been studied as part of the literature on
equilibrium refinement in signaling games (see, e.g., van Damme 1989; Gersbach 2004).
6 In a delegation contract, first studied by Holmstrom (1977), the principal specifies the set of decisions
that the agent is allowed to take and commits not to intervene in the action that the agent chooses from
this set. Next, the agent observes the state and picks her optimal action out of this set. Other contributions
to this literature include Melumad and Shibano (1991), Dessein (2002), Alonso and Matouschek (2008),
Mylovanov (2008), Armstrong and Vickers (2010), Amador and Bagwell (2013a, b), Ambrus and Egorov
(2013), and Frankel (2014).
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that she provides. Ottaviani (2000) shows, for the uniform-quadratic case, that the
principal can guarantee full revelation, but that he is better off with delegation. Krishna
and Morgan (2008) study characteristics of the optimal contract in general settings.
Their so-called imperfect commitment case is the relevant case for a comparison with
our paper. In that case, the principal cannot commit to a decision as a function of
the message he receives, but can commit to a monetary transfer as a function of the
message. They show that, in general, the principal is better off by offering a contract
that induces the agent to pool for high states than one that leads to full revelation.
Although pooling gives rise to a reduction in utility for high states, this is more than
compensated by the reduction in transfers that are needed to induce truth telling for
lower states. In our set-up, the Sender can perfectly reveal her information about the
state through money burning but does not find it in her interest to do so because
pooling some states gives rise to a local gain in utility that more than compensates
any possible additional money that needs to be burned in all the other states. The
balance of local losses and global gains is such that in the uniform-quadratic case,
the principal in Krishna and Morgan (2008) never pays for vague information, only
for precise information. In the same uniform-quadratic case, the Sender in our model
does not burn money to separate an interval of states. Instead, it is only cost-effective
to burn money to adjust the intervals of the semi-pooling communication strategy and,
possibly, to adjust their number.
3 The model
The model is that of ASB. In stage 1, the state of nature t ∈ [0, 1] is privately revealed
to the Sender. This state is distributed according to a distribution function F(t) that
has a strictly positive and continuously differentiable density function f (t) ≡ F ′(t).
In stage 2, the Sender sends the Receiver a signal σ = (m, b), which consists of a
costless message m from some continuum M , and a costly message b ≥ 0 (money
burning). The content of themessagem is unverifiable, i.e., cheap talk, and b is publicly
observed and, hence, verifiable.
Let σ(t) = (m, b) be a pure signaling strategy. Having observed (m, b) the
Receiver forms posterior beliefs about the state, denoted by the CDF G(z|m, b) ≡
Pr[t ≤ z|m, b]. Then, in stage 3, the Receiver takes an action a. Let α(m, b) be his
pure strategy. Preferences of the Sender and the Receiver are given by the following
utility functions US and UR, respectively:
US (a, t,m, b) = u (a, t, x) − b, and UR (a, t,m, b) = uR (a, t),
where x > 0 is a measure of the extent to which the players’ preferences are mis-
aligned.
Following Austen-Smith and Banks (2000), we assume that u(a, t, x) and uR(a, t)
are three times continuously differentiable, are strictly concave and not monotone in
a, and have strictly positive cross partial derivatives uat > 0, uax > 0, uRat > 0. Let
aR(t) denote the action that is best from the Receiver’s perspective in state t :
123
V. Karamychev, B. Visser
aR (t) = argmax
a
uR (a, t),
and let aS(t, x) be the action that is best from the Sender’s perspective in state t :
aS (t, x) = argmax
a
u (a, t, x) .
Under our assumptions, both aR(t) and aS(t, x) are finite and strictly increasing,
and we assume, in addition, that aS(t, x) > aR(t), for all x > 0 and t ∈ [0, 1]. In
order to simplify the exposition, we assume w.l.o.g. that the actions are labeled in such
a way that aR(t) = t (this can always be done due to the monotonicity of aR(t)). The
ex-ante expected utilities from a strategy profile (σ, α) are denoted as follows:
V S (σ, α) ≡ E
[
US (a, t,m, b)
]
= E [u (α (σ (t)) , t, x)] − E [b (t)] , (1)
VR (σ, α) ≡ E
[




uR (α (σ (t)) , t)
]
. (2)
An equilibrium  = 〈σ(t), α(m, b),G(t |m, b)〉 is (i) a signaling strategy of the
Sender σ(t) that is optimal for every state t given the Receiver’s action strategy
α(m, b), (ii) an action strategy α(m, b) that is optimal given beliefs G(t |m, b), and
(iii) Receiver’s beliefs G(t |m, b) that are consistent with σ(t) for signals (m, b) on
the equilibrium path. Ex-ante utilities of the Sender and the Receiver in equilibrium 
are denoted by V S() and V R() respectively. An equilibrium signaling strategy is
denoted by σ. We are interested in the equilibrium that generates the highest ex-ante
expected utility for the Sender.
4 Characteristics of Sender-optimal equilibria
ASB (p. 7) establish that all equilibria have the following structure: there is a partition
(B0 ≡ 0, A1, B1, . . . , BN , AN+1 ≡ 1) with Bi−1 ≤ Ai < Bi ≤ Ai+1 for all i ∈ I =
{1, . . . , N }, such that the Sender pools all states t ∈ (Ai , Bi ) by sending a message
m(t) = mPi (with themeaning “the state t belongs to interval (Ai , Bi )”) and by burning
identical amounts of money bPi . If instead t ∈ (Bi , Ai+1), she separates by sending
distinct messages m(t) = mS(t) (with the meaning “the state is t”) and by burning
distinct amounts of money b(t) = bS(t). As any partition is uniquely defined by its
collection of pooling intervals, wewill abuse terminology by referring to the collection
P() = {(Ai , Bi )|i ∈ I } as the partition of equilibrium . For example, a separating
equilibrium corresponds to P = ∅, and a complete pooling equilibrium corresponds
to P = {(0, 1)}.
ASB establish the existence of a special class of equilibria that can be obtained from
the pure cheap talk equilibria studied in CS by squeezing in “separating segments at
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the far end of any CS partition” (ASB, p. 7).7 We are interested in how the Sender can
best combine cheap talk and money burning and, therefore, cannot limit ourselves to
a special class of equilibria. The next proposition is the first step towards a Sender-
optimal equilibrium.
Proposition 1 For any partition P0, there is an equilibrium0 such that P0 = P(0).
The Sender can arbitrarily choose any number of non-overlapping pooling intervals.
Let SP denote the union of these intervals and let SS = [0, 1]\SP denote the set of
states for which the Sender separates. Proposition 1 means, for example, that full
separation is an equilibrium.
According to Proposition 1, we can search for the Sender-optimal equilibrium
by optimizing V S(σ, α) over the set of all possible partitions, subject to incentive
compatibility constraints and non-negativity of burned money constraints. Note that
Proposition 1 does not imply that the Sender can induce the Receiver to take any set
of actions. For example, if the Sender wants to induce the Receiver to take a single
action, then she must pool, and thus this action can only equal the Receiver’s optimal
action in case of complete pooling.
On the current level of generality, when both players have utility functions u(a, t, x)
and uR(a, t) that are completely independent from each other, the analysis is very
complicated and results are not easy to interpret. We assume in what follows that the
Receiver’s utility is a quadratic loss function uR(a, t) = −(t − a)2 while keeping the
Senders’ utility u(a, t, x) arbitrary. We define:
Ψ (t) ≡ 2utta (t, t, x) + utaa (t, t, x)
2uta (t, t, x)
.
Since function Ψ (t) vanishes for quadratic utility functions u(a, t, x), it can be
interpreted as a measure of a difference between utility function u(a, t, x) and its
second-order approximation, i.e., as a measure of higher-order terms in the Tailor
expansion of u(a, t, x). Suppose we have an equilibrium inwhich the Sender separates
states in an interval. If a simple condition is satisfied, then we can construct another
equilibrium in which the Sender pools some of the states in that interval and that gives
her a higher expected utility.
Proposition 2 Consider an equilibrium  in which the Sender separates all states in






< Ψ (t) <
f (t)




then the Sender benefits from pooling some states in that interval, so that  is not
optimal.
7 Kartik (2007) points out that Theorem 1 in ASB claims in addition that this segment can be squeezed
in “while maintaining the same number of influential cheap talk messages” (page 753). He shows that this
additional claim does not hold.
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Fig. 1 Illustration for Proposition 2
To gain intuition for the condition in Proposition 2, and to understand how local
changes in (B, A) have global consequences—as suggested by the appearance of
F(t) and 1 − F(t) in the condition—we consider an equilibrium  in which the
Sender separates all states in (B, A). The utility v(t) that the Sender gets in (B, A)
is indicated in Fig. 1 by the bold line.
We now try to construct another equilibrium,ε, that is obtained from by adding
a pooling interval (A − ε, A), i.e., P(ε) = P() ∪ {(A − ε, A)}, and by imposing
that v
ε
(A − ε) = v(A − ε). In other words, we try to leave the Sender’s utility
unchanged for t ∈ (B, A − ε] and, instead of separating, we let the Sender pool all
states t ∈ (B, A − ε] in ε. In ε, the Receiver’s best response action to a message
that the state is in (A − ε, A) is strictly larger than his best response action to the
Senders’ message that t = A − ε. Because of uta > 0, this means that in a right
neighborhood of t = A − ε, the Sender benefits from pooling, see the thin (solid and
dashed) lines representing two possibilities for v
ε
(t) in Fig. 1.
Because of the equilibrium conditions, local changes of equilibrium strategies in
the interval (A − ε, A) have global consequences: pooling these states may make
additional money burning necessary for states to the right or to the left of the pooling
interval, and Fig. 1 explains why. For t = A, the difference in utility ϕ(A) = v(A)−
v
ε
(A) depends on the Sender’s utility function and the distribution of states. In the
proof of Proposition 2, we show that for a pooling interval of marginal length ε, the
change in utility is given by
ϕ (A) = uta (A, A, x)
2
(





Since ϕ(A) = 0 for a uniform-quadratic model, the term (Ψ (A) − f ′(A)/ f (A))
can be interpreted as a measure of a difference between the current model and its
uniform-quadratic approximation. Suppose thatΨ (A) > f ′(A)/ f (A) so that ϕ(A) >
0. Then, without any changes in the signaling strategy to the right of A, if the state
is just below A, the Sender would have liked to slightly exaggerate and report a state
just above A. One way to make sure that ε is an equilibrium is to adjust the Sender’s
signaling strategy so that in all states t > A, she burns an additional amount of money
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that is equal to ϕ(A). This restores the continuity of the utility function at t = A,
and guarantees that the equilibrium conditions continue to hold for all t > A. Hence,
an equilibrium ε with a pooling segment of marginal length yields more utility
than  if the additional amount of money burned (1 − F(A))ϕ(A) is smaller than
the gain in utility which turns out to be 12uta(A, A, x) f (A). That is, if the condition
0 < Ψ − f ′f < f1−F holds for t = A, the Sender benefits from pooling some states of
the separating segment.
Alternatively, if ϕ(A) < 0 because of Ψ (A) < f
′(A)
f (A) , the Sender’s utility gets
increased at t = A due to pooling the states; Fig. 1 represents this case by the dashed
line. Without any further changes to the Sender’s money burning strategy, she would
now prefer to underreport the state if she were to observe values of t slightly above
t = A. Oneway tomake sure thatε is an equilibrium is to increase amounts ofmoney
burnt in all states t < A (it may not be possible to burn lessmoney for t > A because,
e.g., in some states above A theSender does not burn anymoney at all in). For pooling
some of the states to be optimal, the additional cost of money burning (−F(A)ϕ(A))
should be smaller than the gain 12uta(A, A, x) f (A), i.e.,− fF < Ψ − f
′
f < 0 evaluated
for t = A.
Proposition 2 has two important consequences. First, by applying the condition
to the whole interval [0, 1] it follows that full revelation (i.e., revealing all states) is
never optimal. The Sender benefits from some vagueness by pooling at least some
interval of states. Pooling some states give rise to a local gain in utility that more
than compensates any possible additional money that needs to be burned globally
(i.e., outside the interval of pooled states). Thus, combining Propositions 1 and 2 we
conclude that:
Corollary 1 Even though the perfectly separating equilibrium is always feasible, it
is never Sender-optimal.
The second consequence deals with the class of state distributions with log-concave
densities and the much-used quadratic loss function. With such preferences,Ψ (t) = 0
for all t .Moreover, a log-concave density has an increasing hazard rate and a decreasing
reversed hazard rate, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005). This suffices to show that
− f (t)F(t) + f
′(t)




f (t) > 0 for all t . Thus,
Corollary 2 Let the utility function u(a, t, x) of the Sender be a quadratic loss func-
tion, i.e., u(a, t, x) = −(a − t − x)2, and let the states have a log-concave density
f (t). Then, in an optimal equilibrium the Sender does not separate any interval of
states.
Corollary 2 implies that, in a large class of models (including the uniform-quadratic
case), communication is garbled in a Sender-optimal equilibrium, for all states. What
role can money burning play in an optimal equilibrium, if it cannot lead to separation?
Logically, two possibilities remain. It is either not used at all, or it is used but only
to re-arrange the pooling intervals in the equilibrium partition, relative to what they
would have been in the absence of money burning. In the latter case, money burning
may also give rise to a different number of pooling intervals. To better see whether
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and how the Sender uses money burning, in the next section we derive the optimal
equilibrium for the well-known uniform-quadratic case.
5 Sender-optimal equilibrium in the uniform-quadratic case
We use asterisks to denote variables in the Sender’s optimal equilibrium ∗. The next
proposition characterizes the Sender’s maximization problem.
Proposition 3 In the uniform-quadratic case, an optimal equilibrium ∗ always
exists. Its equilibrium partition P∗ = P(∗) contains a finite number N∗ of pooling
intervals (Ai , Ai+1) that fully cover the state space [0, 1]. Number N∗ and marginal
states {Ai }, i = 1, . . . , N∗ solve the following maximization problem:
max
N ,{Ai },c




(Ai+1 − Ai )3 (4)
subject to : bPi = (Ai+1 + Ai ) x −
1
4
(Ai+1 − Ai )2 + c ≥ 0 (5)
In this optimization, the Sender chooses a number of intervals N , positions of (N − 1)
distinct marginal states, {Ai }, and a parameter c. Figure 2 shows that there is a trade-
off in the above optimization. The bold solid curve represents a utility function v1(t)
of the Sender in state t , for an equilibrium 1 with (at least) three pooling intervals
in the partition, (ti , ti+1), (ti+1, ti+2), and (ti+2, ti+3). In each pooling interval, the
(smallest) vertical distance between the graph of v1(t) and the horizontal axis is
equal to bPi . The ex-ante expected utility of the Sender is V
S the (negative of) the
shaded area above v1(t).
By merging two intervals (ti , ti+1) and (ti+1, ti+2) into one single pooling interval
(ti , ti+2), we get a new equilibrium 2, with the utility function v2(t) (bold dashed
curve). As one can see, this has a positive effect on V S. If however, we merge all
three intervals into a single pooling interval (ti , ti+3) without changing parameter c,
the amount of money to be burned in states t ∈ (ti , ti+3) would have become negative
Fig. 2 Illustration for Proposition 3
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(thin dotted curve, which goes above the horizontal axis). Thus, the value of c must
be increased so as to just make the graph of v3(t) touching the horizontal axis, (thin
solid line).
The trade-off the Sender faces can now be seen. On the one hand, she benefits from
having fewer but longer pooling intervals in an equilibrium, since this increases the
sum in (4). On the other hand, such a strategy would potentially require a larger value
of parameter c, i.e., more burned money in all states, due to (5), which lowers her
utility V S directly.
Proposition 4 below gives the main features of the equilibrium. It shows for which
degree of misalignment x the Sender actually burns money in the optimal equilibrium.
It also shows how the optimal equilibrium partition P(∗) is related to that of CS.
Before we state the proposition, a small digression on the Crawford and Sobel (1982)
model is needed. Recall that in CS, money burning is absent and communication can
only take place through cheap talk. In equilibrium there is an upper bound on the
number of distinct messages that the Sender can use. For every integer N ≥ 2, let us
define xN as follows:
xN ≡ 1
2N (N − 1) . (6)
Without the option to burn money, if the degree of misalignment satisfies x ∈
[xN+1, xN ), then for every value of n = 1, . . . , N there exists an equilibrium in
which the Sender can induce the Receiver to take exactly n actions. For every x , the
equilibrium with the highest number of messages N , is called the most informative
equilibrium, denoted byCT. For any given value of x , the Sender prefers the equilib-
riumCT with the largest number ofmessages N . Let σCT denote themost informative
cheap talk strategy.
It turns out that the structure of σ ∗ is closely related to the structure of σCT. The
intuition is that an additional communication instrument—money burning—can be
used to alleviate the bound on the number N of distinct actions that the Sender can
induce the Receiver to take. This is particularly cost-effective for those values of x
for which a slight reduction in x would already have led to an increase in the number
of such actions in the absence of money burning. Alternatively, money burning can
be used to change the lengths of the intervals of the pure cheap talk partition PCT.
This is particularly beneficial for values of x for which an additional interval has just
emerged in PCT. This intuition is borne out by the next proposition.
Proposition 4 For every N ≥ 4 there exist a y
N
and y¯N satisfying xN+1 < y¯N+1 <
y
N
< xN < y¯N , such that in an optimal equilibrium ∗:
(a) if x ∈ [xN , y¯N ), the Sender burns money. Compared with CT, she induces one
additional action, N∗ = N + 1, P∗ = PCT.
(b) if x ∈ (y
N
, xN ), the Sender burns money. Compared with CT, she induces the
same number of actions, N∗ = N but re-arranges the partition, P∗ = PCT .
Proposition 4 illustrates how the Sender uses money burning to adjust the partition
in an optimal equilibrium even if she does not use it to reveal any specific state. This
result will qualitatively carry over to situations with other log-concave densities.
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Fig. 3 The amount of money burned in the second interval bP2 , and the ex-ante probability that money will
be burned Pr[b∗(t) > 0], as functions of x
In what follows we study inmore depth how, for the uniform-quadratic case, money
burning shapes the equilibrium partition.
It follows from the proof of Proposition 4 that in the uniform-quadratic case money
burning is used in the second interval only. Figure 3 illustrates how, for different
values of x , money burning is present or absent in the optimal equilibrium ∗ in an
alternating pattern. It shows the amount of money burned bP2 in the second interval of
∗ (thin line, right scale), and the ex-ante probability that the Sender burns money,
Pr[b(t) > 0] (thick line, left scale), which is the length of the second interval provided
bP2 > 0. One can see, e.g., that at x = y¯4 = 122 , the length of this interval is zero, and
increases with further reductions in x . At x = y
4
≈ 0.039, the Sender burns money
for nearly 20% of the states. The amount of money burned bP2 is strictly positive at
x = y¯4, and decreases with further reductions in x .
If x > y¯4 = 122 , money burning cannot improve upon the most informative cheap
talk equilibrium.That is, formoneyburning to improve theSender’s utility, the interests
between Sender and Receiver should be sufficiently well aligned such that unaided
cheap talk communication allows her to induce at least three actions.
We illustrate the two parts of Proposition 4 with one figure each. Figure 4 is drawn
for x = 0.042. Since x ∈ (x4, y¯4), the most informative cheap talk equilibrium CT
has three intervals (with up to three digits of accuracy):
PCT = {(0, 0.165) , (0.165, 0.499) , (0.499, 1)} ,
whereas the optimal equilibrium ∗ has four intervals:
P∗ = {(0, 0.066) , (0.066, 0.176) , (0.176, 0.504) , (0.504, 1)} .
Figure 4 shows the ex-post equilibrium utility functions v(t) of the Sender inCT
and ∗, and the money burning function b∗(t). She burns bP2 ≈ 5.5 × 10−3 in the
second interval of P∗.
Figure 5 is drawn for x = 0.04. Since x ∈ (y
4
, x4), it illustrates a situation in
which the Sender does not burn money to induce the Receiver to take a larger number
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Fig. 4 Equilibria CT and ∗ for x = 0.042
Fig. 5 Equilibria CT and ∗ for x = 0.04
of actions, but to improve the existing actions. Indeed, the most informative cheap talk
strategy σCT has four distinct messages,
PCT = {(0, 0.01) , (0.01, 0.18) , (0.118, 0.51) , (0.51, 1)} ,
and so does the optimal equilibrium strategy in the presence of money burning,
P∗ = {(0, 0.035) , (0.035, 0.185) , (0.185, 0.512) , (0.512, 1)} .
The figure shows ex-post equilibrium utility functions v(t) of the Sender in CT
and ∗, and the money burning function b∗(t). She burns bP2 ≈ 2.0 × 10−3 in the
second interval of P∗.
Above, we have derived the Sender’s optimal equilibrium. The Receiver’s opti-
mal equilibrium is, clearly, the perfectly separating equilibrium. Indeed, the ex-ante
expected utility V R() of the Receiver equals:
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(Bi − Ai )3 .
The Receiver experiences a utility loss from any pooling intervals and, therefore,
obtains his first best level of utility in the perfectly separating equilibrium. A natural
question that arises is what equilibrium is best from a social welfare perspective.
Define the social welfare function as follows:
V SW () ≡ (1 − α) VR () + αV S () , α ∈ (0, 1) .
Thus,




c + x2 + x
)






(Bi − Ai )3
)
,
which only differs from V S() by the multiplier 3α−12α . As a result of this similarity,
Proposition 4 continues to hold for the efficient equilibrium SW, i.e., the equilibrium
thatmaximizes the socialwelfare function, providedα > 1/3.Thus,when theSender’s
contribution to the Social Welfare function is at least one third, the number of pooling
intervals in SW is finite, the Sender burns money in at most one interval; if she burns
money, she does so in the second interval only; and the values of x for which she does
so are close to the values of xN . In short, all results from this Section continue to hold
qualitatively for this new objective function, although the exact values of the marginal
states in the partition supporting the efficient equilibrium, and the exact amounts of
money burnt, will be different from ∗.
6 Sender-optimality and separation
In the previous two sections, we have derived conditions under which the Sender
prefers communication that is garbled. In this section, we discuss situations in which
she might prefer truthful revelation of her private information.
It logically follows from Corollary 1 that for the Sender to reveal truthfully all her
private information in an optimal equilibrium, one needs to step outside the model
assumed in Sect. 3. The explanation of condition (1) in Sect. 4 suggests one such step.
We have explained there that the Sender benefits locally from garbling information,
possibly at the expense ofmoremoneyburning in other states.Bygarbling information,
she induces the Receiver to take a higher action from which she benefits in the right
neighborhood of t = t˜ ≡ A − ε, see Fig. 1. This benefit is due to the single-crossing
property uta > 0. Formally, if we define the difference in the Sender’s utility between
these two equilibria as θ(ε, t) ≡ v(t) − vε (t) and aε = E[t |t ∈ (t˜, A)] as the
Receiver’s best reply to the pooling message, one can obtain:8
∂θ
∂t
(ε, t) = −
∫ aε
t˜
uat (z, t˜, x)dz.
8 See details in the proof of Proposition 2.
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in some right neighborhood of t˜ . Of course, this local benefit alone is not sufficient
for ε to be a superior equilibrium to  from the Senders’ prospective. Nevertheless,
eliminating this local benefit, as we will see, is a way to construct a model in which
truthful revelation of all information is optimal for the Sender.
If one keeps the single-crossing property, local gains disappear if the Receiver does
not take a higher action when information is garbled, i.e., when aε = t˜ . This implies
that he must get a punishment if the state turns out to be lower than the chosen action.
Moreover, it must be so large that even a tiny chance of such a punishment makes
the Receiver worse off. Thus, marginal punishment must be infinite, and his utility
function must be discontinuous.
We consider, therefore, a variation on the standard quadratic loss function. Let the
Receiver’s utility uR(a, t) be given by
uR (a, t) =
{− (t − a)2 , i f t ≥ a
− (t − a)2 − γ, i f t < a, (7)
with γ > 1. In other words, relative to the standard quadratic loss function, the
Receiver experiences additional disutility γ if the state t turns out to be lower than the
action a he takes.
This discontinuity in the utility function of the Receiver at a = t may arise in
policy areas where any deviation from the right level of preparation is costly, but lack
of preparation carries a separate, additional cost.9 A key example is the reputational
damage to the decision maker for being caught ‘unprepared.’ Another example is the
loss to society from suffering floods due to dykes of insufficient height: even a small
flood causes a discrete drop in welfare. The same discrete drop accompanies terrorism
or health risks that have materialized due to insufficient investigative or detection
capacity.
The Sender-optimal equilibrium for this uniform-quadratic model with discontin-
uous loss γ turns out to be the perfectly separating equilibrium, as the following
proposition states.
Proposition 5 Let F(t) = t , u(a, t, x) = −(t + x − a)2, and uR(a, t) be given by
(7). Then, in the optimal equilibrium, the Sender burns money to truthfully reveal all
states, P(∗) = ∅.
Although there remains a conflict between the Sender and the Receiver as to the
optimal action in a given state, the change in the utility function of the Receiver makes
both of them experiencing a large disutility stemming from communicating ‘vague’
information (i.e., a message from pooling interval). With γ > 1, the Receiver’s best-
reply to vague information is the lowest possible action consistent with the message.
This aligns their preferences across equilibria, and the perfectly separating equilibrium
is the unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium.
Can it be optimal for the Sender to burn money to reveal some of her private infor-
mationwithout assuming a discontinuous utility function? This paper does not answer
9 If we interpret t = 0 as the worst situation and t = 1 as the best one.
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this question, as there is an important asymmetry between showing sub-optimality of
pooling and sub-optimality of separation on an interval (A, B).
There is a unique way to separate states from an interval (A, B), namely by let-
ting the Sender send different signals in all these states. Thus, in order to show that
separation on (A, B) is sub-optimal, it is sufficient to find one way to pool some of
states in (A, B) that generates a higher utility for the Sender than the unique way of
separation. Our condition (3) represents one such a test.
There are, however, infinitely many ways of pooling states from an interval (A, B)
into sub-intervals: any partition of (A, B) represents one such possibility. Therefore,
in order to show that separation on (A, B) is optimal, one needs to show that separation
is better than any such way of pooling those states. This is much more demanding than
what is required for deriving condition (3).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how a privately informed Sender can influence a decision-maker
by using both cheap talk messages and money burning. We focus on the Sender’s
optimal equilibrium.We have shown that the Sender always garbles some information
and that for a large class of cases—including the much studied uniform-quadratic
case—the Sender garbles all information. Money burning, although it makes truthful
revelation feasible, is either not used at all, or it is used to improve the actions that the
Receiver takes by improving upon the partition that she would have used if the Sender
could only use cheap talk. If money burning is used to improve the actions, it can
also be used in the optimal equilibrium to induce an additional action. We have also
shown that if garbled information induces the Receiver to act conservatively because
of a discontinuity in his utility function, the Sender optimally reveals all her private
information.
De Haan et al. (2015) study how subjects in a laboratory experiment use cheap talk
and money burning in the uniform-quadratic case for various degrees of preference
misalignment. It is unlikely that any lab experiment will be able to mimic the precise
alternating pattern of the presence and absence of money burning as a function of
the misalignment parameter that we have shown to be the best from the Sender’s
perspective. They do find, however, that Senders have a strong preference for cheap
talk, and that they do not burn money to support intervals of full separation.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1 In this proof, we use the following lemma, proven in ASB, p.
7.
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Lemma 1 The money burning function b(t) is differentiable almost everywhere on
[0, 1].
The proof of Proposition 1 is constructive.We distinguish between finite and infinite
partitions.
(A) Finite partitions
Let the number N of pooling intervals (Ai , Bi ) ∈ P0 be finite. For the sake of conve-
nience, we index intervals in the order of their positions, i.e., Bi−1 ≤ Ai < Bi ≤ Ai+1,
for all i = 1, . . . , N , N∈ N, where B0≡ 0 and AN+1≡ 1. We construct the equilib-
rium 0 in four steps. In step 1, we define Receiver’s beliefs and his best response
strategy α(m, b). In step 2, we use the Sender’s local incentive compatibility condi-
tions to partially determine her best response signaling strategy σ(t) = (m(t), b(t)).
In step 3, we fully determine σ(t) by preventing global deviations. Finally, in step 4,
we choose off-path beliefs.
Step 1.
If t ∈ (Ai , Bi ), the message of the Sender is mPi =“the state t ∈ (Ai , Bi )”, and the
amount of money burned is b(t) = bPi . The belief of the Receiver is that t ∈ (Ai , Bi )
and the best response strategy is α(mPi , b
P






uR (a, t) |t ∈ (Ai , Bi )
]
. (8)
If t ∈ (Bi , Ai+1), the message of the Sender ismS(t) =“the state is t”, and the amount
of money burned is b(t) = bS(t). The belief of the Receiver is that state t equals the
reported state, and the best response strategy is α(mS(t), bS(t)) = t .
Step 2.
If t ∈ (Ai , Bi ), and the Sender signals σ Pi = (mPi , bPi ), she gets utility
vPi (t) = u(ai , t, x) − bPi . (9)
If t ∈ (Bi , Ai+1) but the Sender signals as if the state were z ∈ (Bi , Ai+1), she
gets utility
v (t, z) = u (z, t, x) − bS (z) .
In 0, a necessary truth-telling condition is that v(t, z) attains its maximum at
z = t . As bS(z) is differentiable by Lemma 1, the first-order condition 0 = ∂v





ua (z, z, x) dz + bSi , (10)
where bSi is a constant of integration, yet to be determined.
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Thus, if t ∈ (Bi , Ai+1), and the Sender signals σ S(t) = (mS(t), bS(t)) she gets
utility
vS (t) = u (t, t, x) − bS (t) = u (t, t, x) −
∫ t
Bi
ua (z, z, x) dz − bSi . (11)
Step 3.
Toprevent global deviations itmust necessarily be that vPi (Ai ) = vS(Ai ) and vPi (Bi ) =
vS(Bi ). These two equalities imply:
⎧⎨
⎩
bSi = u (Bi , Bi , x) − u (ai , Bi , x) + bPi
bPi+1 = u (ai+1, Ai+1, x) − u (Ai+1, Ai+1, x) +
∫ Ai+1
Bi
ua (t, t, x) dt + bSi
(12)
Thus, constants bPi and b
S
i are linearly dependent. Since the number of equations is
one less than the number of the constants, one of the constants, e.g., bP1 , can be chosen
freely, and the others will follow from (12).
We need to ensure that the amounts of money burned in each state are non-negative,
and that there is a state in which no money is burned. We define Pi , 
S
i , and b˜ as
follows:
Pi ≡ bPi − bP1 , Si ≡
{
bSi − bP1 , i f Bi < Ai+1
0, i f Bi = Ai+1









The last inequality follows fromP1 = 0. In other words,Pi is the difference between
money burned in intervals i and 1. Likewise, for separating intervals Si is the dif-
ference between money burned in the separating state t = Bi and in the first pooling
interval 1. It follows from (12) that Pi and 
S
i are fully determined by marginal types
{Ai } and {Bi }. Finally, when bP1 is set to zero, bP1 = 0, b˜ is the lowest of bPi and bSi by
construction. It is easy to see that by taking bP1 = −b˜, we ensure that (i) all bPi and bSi
are non-negative, and (ii) at least one bPi or b
S
i is zero due to finite N . We denote this
strategy profile by 0 = (σ0, α0), and a state in which no money is burned by t0: if
bSi = 0 then t0 = Bi , and if bPi = 0 then we take any t0 ∈ (Ai , Bi ).
In order to check that the Sender does not want to deviate globally, we note that
d
dt
vPi (Ai ) >
d
dt
vS (Ai ) and
d
dt
vPi (Bi ) <
d
dt
vS (Bi ) .
Together with vPi (Ai ) = vS(Ai ) and vPi (Bi ) = vS(Bi ), this implies that for any
t ∈ (Ai , Bi ), the Sender strictly prefers to pool with σ Pi rather than to signal σ Si−1 just
below Ai or to signal σ Si just above Bi . Due to the assumed single-crossing property
uat > 0, she never prefers to deviate if the state is even further away from (Ai , Bi ).
Similarly, for any t ∈ (Bi , Ai+1), the Sender strictly prefers to signal t = Bi rather
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than to signal just below it, and strictly prefers to signal t = Ai+1 rather than to signal
just above it. Due to the single-crossing property, neither does she have a profitable
deviation further away from (Bi , Ai+1). Thus, the utility of the Sender v(t, z) in state
t who signals as if she had observed state z,
v (t, z) =
{
u (ai , t, x) − bPi , i f z ∈ (Ai , Bi )
u (z, t, x) − bS (z) , i f z ∈ SS (14)
where bPi and b
S(z) are characterized above, satisfies the global incentive compatibility
constrains v(t, t) ≥ v(t, z) for t, z ∈ [0, 1].
Step 4.
By construction, there is a state t = t0 in which the Sender burns no money. If this
state is a lower bound of a separating interval, i.e., t0 = Bi < Ai+1, the off-path
beliefs for any off-path signal σOFF can be that the Sender signals σOFF only in state
t = t0. If, to the contrary, it is an interior point of a pooling interval, i.e., t0 ∈ (Ai , Bi ),
the off-path beliefs can be that only for states t ∈ (Ai , Bi ) she sends off-path signals.
Then, all the equilibrium conditions will be satisfied.
(B) Infinite partitions
Let the number of pooling intervals (Ai , Bi ) ∈ P0 be infinite. We order the intervals
in P0 by their lengths, Di = Bi − Ai , i.e., Di ≥ Di+1 for all i = 1, . . .∞. In
other words, we let interval (A1, B1) be the longest, then the second-longest interval
(A2, B2) follows, etc.
Let us consider a sequence of partitions {P(k)}, k = 1, . . .∞, where P(k) consists
of k longest intervals from P0:
P(k) = {(Ai , Bi ) , i = 1, . . . , k} .
In what follows we use the superscript (k) to refer to variables corresponding to
the partition P(k), and omit the superscript when we refer to the limiting partition P0,
which is considered as a limit of P(k) when k → ∞. For each finite k, we construct a
strategy profile (σ˜ , α˜)(k) as described above in step 3 for finite partitions, and denote
the utility function (14) in (σ˜ , α˜)(k) by v(k)(t, z).
In step 1 below, we show that the limiting strategy profile (σ˜ , α˜) is well defined.
In step 2, we show that a necessary condition for (σ˜ , α˜) to be an equilibrium strategy
profile holds for all on-path signals. In step 3, we show that in (σ˜ , α˜), there always
exists a state t0 in which no money is burned. By choosing off-path beliefs as in step
4 for finite partitions, we turn (σ˜ , α˜) into an equilibrium strategy profile 0 with
infinitely many pooling intervals.
Step 1.
By construction, in marginal states t ∈ ⋃ki=1{Ai , Bi } of a finite partition P(k), the
Sender has multiple best responses, and we assume that she separates when she is
indifferent between separating and pooling with other states. As a result, for any finite
partition P(k), the set SP of all states in which the Sender pools in (σ˜ , α˜)(k) is open.
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In an infinite partition P0, SP is a union of open sets and, therefore, is also open, and
SS is closed.
Consider a state t ∈ [0, 1]. If t ∈ SP in P0 so that t pools, then t ∈ (Ai , Bi ) for
some i . In this case, m(t) = mPi (defined in step 1 for finite partitions) in all (σ˜ , α˜)(k)
for k ≥ i , so that m(k)(t) converges to mPi . If t ∈ SS in P0 so that t separates, then
m(t) = mS(t) (defined in step 1 for finite partitions) for all k. Thus, for any t , m(k)(t)
is eventually constant and converges to a well defined m(t).
To show that b(k)(t) also converges to its limit b(t), we consider two strategy profiles
(σ˜ , α˜)(k) and (σ˜ , α˜)(k+1). Partition P(k+1) has one extra interval of length Dk+1:
P(k+1) = P(k) ∪ {(Ak+1, Bk+1)} .
We define the difference
dk+1 (t) ≡ b(k+1) (t) − b(k) (t) ,
so that we can write b(k+1) = b(1) + ∑2≤i≤k+1 di . We will show that |dk | ≤ Q · Dk
for some constant Q and, therefore,
∑
2≤i≤k+1
|di | ≤ Q
∑
2≤i≤k+1
|Di | ≤ Q,
so that b(k)(t) converges uniformly to its limit b(t), by the Weierstrass M-test.
Let the pooling interval (Ak+1, Bk+1) ∈ P(k+1) be inserted after an interval




B(k)i = B(k+1)i ≤ A(k+1)i+1 < B(k+1)i+1 ≤ A(k)i+1 = A(k+1)i+2 .
For j ≤ i , all bPj and bSj are identical in both in (σ˜ , α˜)(k) and (σ˜ , α˜)(k+1). To
the contrary, for j > i , bPj and b
S
j will be determined by b
S
i and (12). Under the
assumed regularity conditions on the state distribution and on the players’ utility
functions, variables bPj and b
S
j are continuously differentiable functions of B
(k+1)
i+1 for
B(k+1)i+1 ∈ [A(k+1)i+1 , A(k+1)i+2 ] and j > i . Thus, the amount of money b(k+1)(t) burned
in state t can be written as a continuously differentiable function of B(k+1)i+1 , i.e.,
b(k+1)(t) = b˜(k+1)(t, B(k+1)i+1 ). By construction, b˜(k+1)(t, A(k+1)i+1 ) = b(k)(t). Hence,









and, by the Mean Value Theorem, dk+1 = Dk+1 ∂ b˜(k+1)
∂B(k+1)i+1






. Since ∂ b˜
(k+1)
∂B(k+1)i+1
(t, B) is continuous on (t, B) ∈ [0, 1] ×
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, it is bounded, i.e.,
∣∣ ∂ b˜(k+1)
∂B(k+1)i+1
∣∣ ≤ Q, so that |dk | ≤ Q · Dk . Thus,
b(k)(t) converges to b(t) uniformly, so that the limiting strategy σ˜ is well defined. The
Receiver’s limiting best response α˜ is alsowell defined for on-path signals: α˜(σ˜ (t)) = t
if t ∈ SS and α(σ˜ (t)) = ai (defined in (8)) if t ∈ (Ai , Bi ).
Step 2.
For profiles (σ˜ , α˜)(k) and (σ˜ , α˜), we define Receiver’s actions in state t as
a(k) (t) ≡ α˜(k)(σ˜ (k) (t) ) and a (t) ≡ α˜ (σ˜ (t)) , respectively.
Consider v(k)(t, z) = u(a(k)(z), t, x) − b(k)(z), and its limit v(t, z) when k → ∞.
Since function u is continuous and a(k)(z) and b(k)(z) converge (step 1), the condition
v(k)(t, t)≥v(k)(t, z) also holds in the limit for all t and z. That is, v(t, t) ≥ v(t, z).
Step 3.
As in step3 forfinite partitions,weuse (13) to setbP1 = −b˜.As a result, inf t∈[0,1] b(t) =
0.We now show the existence of a state t0 in which nomoney is burned, i.e., b(t0) = 0.
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose, therefore, that b(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1] in
(σ˜ , α˜). We will show that this leads to v(t, t) < v(t, z) for some t and z, contradicting
v(t, t) ≥ v(t, z) for all t and z.
When b(t) > 0, starting from an arbitrary t1 ∈ [0, 1], we construct an infinite




. The sequence {tn} is
bounded and, therefore, has an accumulation point. Let t∗ be such a point. There are
infinitely many members of {tn} in either a left or right neighborhood of t∗. In what
follows we focus on the left neighborhood (t∗ − ε, t∗). Very similar arguments hold
for the right neighborhood (t∗, t∗ + ε).
From {tn}, we construct a strictly increasing subsequence of states {tnm } and denote
it by {tˆm} = {tnm }. By construction, when m → ∞, both sequences {tˆm} and {b(tˆm)}
monotonically converge to t∗ and zero, respectively. We will show that v(t∗, t∗) <
v(t∗, tˆm) for all m large enough, and we have reached the contradiction.
First, state t∗ must be a separating state. If this were not the case, then t∗ ∈ (Ai , Bi )
for some i , and tˆm would eventually be in (Ai , Bi ) so that b(tˆm+1) = b(tˆm), contra-
dicting b(tˆm+1) < b(tˆm). Therefore, t∗ ∈ SS, a(t∗) = t∗, and b∗ ≡ b(t∗) > 0.
Second, a(tˆm) must converge to t∗, when m → ∞. This is easy to see when the
number of pooling states in {tˆm} is finite, because tˆm is eventually a separating state
and a(tˆm) = tˆm for all m large enough, and tˆm converges to t∗. When the number of
pooling states in {tˆm} is infinite, we construct a subsequence {tˆml } that includes all
pooling states from {tˆm}. For any l = 1, . . .∞, there is an interval (Ail , Bil ) such
that tˆml ∈ (Ail , Bil ) and a(tˆml ) = ail ∈ (Ail , Bil ). Since intervals (Ail , Bil ) and
(Ail+1 , Bil+1) are disjoint,
Ail < tˆml < Bil < Ail+1 < tˆml+1 < Bil+1 < t
∗, and Ail < ail < Bil < t∗.
Therefore, since tˆml → t∗ when l → ∞, so do Ail → t∗, Bil → t∗, and a(tˆml ) →
t∗. This, in turn, implies that for all m large enough, a(tˆm) is arbitrary close to tˆm
irrespective of whether tˆm is a pooling or separating state. Hence, a(tˆm) → t∗.
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Third, it must be that v(t∗, t∗) < v(t∗, tˆm) for allm large enough. To show this, we




) = u(a(t∗), t∗, x) − b(t∗) = u(t∗, t∗, x) − b∗.




) = u (a (tˆm
)
, t∗, x







) = u (t∗, t∗, x) − limm→∞ b
(
tˆm
) = u (t∗, t∗, x) > v (t∗, t∗) .
This implies that v(t∗, t∗) < v(t∗, tˆm) for all m large enough.
Thus, the assumption that b(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1] leads to a contradiction. Thus,
there exists a state t0 in which no money is burned. By choosing off-path beliefs as in
Step 4 for finite partitions, we turn (σ˜ , α˜) into an equilibrium 0 with infinitely many
pooling intervals, which ends the proof. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 We prove the proposition in four steps. In step 1, we compute
Sender’s utility v(t) in  for separating states t ∈ (B, A). In step 2, we try to
construct an equilibrium ε which differs from  in only two ways: (i) the Sender
pools states t ∈ (A − ε, A) ⊂ (B, A), for some small ε, and (ii) she burns different
amounts of money in higher states t ∈ (A, 1]. We compute utility vε (t) of the Sender
in ε for pooling states t ∈ (A − ε, A), and derive a sufficient condition when this
construction is possible for marginally small ε, i.e., when ε → 0. If this condition
holds, then, in step 3, we show that condition (1) of the proposition implies that the
Sender’s ex-ante expected utility satisfies V S(ε) > V S(), so that separating states
t ∈ (B, A) is sub-optimal.
If the sufficient condition for the construction used in step 2 fails, then, in step
4, we construct an equilibrium ε differently, again by letting the Sender pool t ∈
(A− ε, A) ⊂ (B, A), for some small ε, but now by letting her burn different amounts
in lower states t ∈ [0, A−ε). Here again, we show that condition (3) of the proposition
implies that the Sender’s ex-ante expected utility satisfies V S(ε) > V S(), so that
separating states t ∈ (B, A) is sub-optimal.
Step 1.
Let be an equilibriumwith a partition P = P(), and let (B, A) ⊂ SS be an interval
of states that the Sender separates. Using (10), we write bS(t) = ∫ tB ua(z, z, x)dz +
bS(B) for t ∈ (B, A). In state t ∈ (B, A), the Sender gets utility v(t) given by (11):
v (t) = u (t, t, x) − bS (t) = u (t, t, x) −
∫ t
B
ua (z, z, x) dz − bS (B) .
Step 2.
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Let us take a small ε > 0 so that A − ε > B, and define t˜ ≡ A − ε for convenience.
We consider a partition Pε = P()∪ {(t˜, A)} and a corresponding equilibrium ε in
which the Sender pools in states t ∈ (t˜, A) ⊂ (B, A). We use the superscript ε for all
variables in ε. The optimal action aε for the newly pooled states t ∈ (t˜, A) is:





Sender’s utility in state t ∈ (t˜, A) is then vε (t) = u(aε, t, x) − bP,ε where bP,ε is
the amount of money burned in the pooling interval (t˜, A) in ε.
First, we try to construct ε in such a way that in state t = t˜ , the Sender gets equal
utility in  and ε, i.e., v
ε
(t˜) = v(t˜). This determines bP,ε:
bP,ε = u (aε, t˜, x) − u (t˜, t˜, x) +
∫ t˜
B
ua (z, z, x) dz + bS (B) .
Therefore, for t ∈ (t˜, A), the utility function vε (t) is:
v
ε
(t) = u (aε, t, x) − u (aε, t˜, x) + u (t˜, t˜, x) −
∫ t˜
B
ua (z, z, x) dz − bS (B) .
We define the difference:
θ (ε, t) ≡ v (t) − vε (t) .



















due to uat > 0 and aε > t˜ . Hence, v
ε
(t) > v(t) in some right neighborhood of t˜ ,
see Fig. 1. At t = A, the difference in utility ϕ(ε), is:
ϕ (ε) ≡ θ (ε, A) = v (A) − vε (A) ,
can be either positive or negative. Step 3 deals with the case when ϕ(ε) > 0 whereas
the case ϕ(ε) ≤ 0 is considered in step 4.
Step 3.
If ϕ(ε) > 0, pooling states t ∈ (t˜, A] results in a lower utility of the Sender in
state t = A. For Pε to be an equilibrium partition, it suffices that the amount of
money that she burns for t > A must be increased by ϕ(ε). It can be shown that
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ϕ(0) = ϕ′(0) = ϕ′′(0) = 0 and, finally,
ϕ′′′ (0) = 1
2
uta (A, A, x)
(






Hence, if 0 < Ψ − f
′
f at t = A, there is an ε >0 such thatϕ(ε) > 0 for all ε ∈ (0, ε).
The net ex-ante expected utility gain g(ε) ≡ E[vε (t) − v(t)] from pooling states













(A) − v (A)
)
(1 − F (A)) .
It can be shown that g(0) = g′(0) = g′′(0) = 0, and, finally,
g′′′ (0) = −1
2














Sender strictly prefers ε to .
Step 4.
If ϕ(ε) < 0, pooling states t ∈ (t˜, A) results in a higher utility of the Sender in state
t = A. For Pε to be an equilibrium partition, the amounts of money that the Sender
burns in all states t > A must be decreased by −ϕ(ε) ≥ 0. Since this is not always
feasible (if, e.g., in some states t > A, no money is burned in ), we now require
that in all lower states t < t˜ , the Sender burns an extra amount of money −ϕ(ε) ≥ 0
relative to what she burns in . It can then be shown that when − fF < Ψ − f
′
f < 0,
the Sender strictly prefers ε to .
The only special case left is when Ψ = f
′
f . When Ψ = f
′
f , whether ϕ(ε) ≥ 0
or ϕ(ε) ≤ 0 is determined by higher-order derivatives. Nevertheless, one of these
inequalities will hold and, therefore, condition (1) is the sufficient condition for this
special case. unionsq
Proof of Corollary 1 The feasibility of a separating equilibrium follows from Propo-
sition 1. We prove its sub-optimality by contradiction. Suppose that a separating
equilibrium is Sender-optimal. Then, condition (1) must fail in all states, i.e., for
any t ∈ (0, 1) either
(





F (t)≤ − f (t) , or (15)
(





(1 − F (t))≥ f (t) (16)
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holds. At t = 0, condition (15) fails so that, by continuity, it also fails to hold for
t close to zero. Thus, condition (16) must hold, i.e., (Ψ (0) − f
′
(0)
f (0) )≥ f (0) > 0. On
the other hand, at t = 1, condition (16) fails so that condition (15) must hold, i.e.,
(Ψ (1) − f
′
(1)
f (1) )≤ − f (1) < 0. As Ψ − f
′
f is continuous, there exists a state tˆ ∈ (0, 1)
at which Ψ − f
′
f = 0. This implies that (3) holds at t = tˆ , a contradiction. Hence,
condition (3) must necessarily hold for some t ∈ (0, 1) and complete separation is
sub-optimal. unionsq
Proof of Corollary 2 The left-hand side and right-hand side of (3) can be written as
follows:










and RHS = f (t)










where r(t) = f (t)1−F(t) is the hazard rate, and λ(t) ≡ f (t)F(t) is the reversed hazard rate.
The log-concave density implies both an increasing hazard rate, r
′
(t) > 0, and a
decreasing reversed hazard rate, λ
′
(t) < 0, see, e.g., Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005).
Moreover, as Ψ (t) = 0 for the quadratic loss function, the result follows. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 In this proof, we use the following lemma, proven inAppendix
B. unionsq
Lemma 2 The optimal number of pooling intervals is finite, i.e., N∗ < ∞.
In the proof of Lemma 2 we show that if an equilibrium  had infinitely many
pooling intervals, then there must have been infinitely many infinitely small intervals
located infinitely close to each other in the state space. By pooling some of those
intervals, we construct another equilibrium which yields a higher expected utility to
the Sender.
According to Proposition 1, Corollary 2, andLemma2,we can search for an optimal
equilibrium by searching through the set of finite partitions P consisting of pooling
intervals only, Bi = Ai+1. We prove the proposition in 2 steps. In step 1, we derive
the optimization problem (4) and (5) that ∗ should solve. In step 2, we show that this
problem always has a solution.
Step 1.
Derivations here replicate a large part of the derivations used in the proof of Lemma
2. We write Bi = Ai+1, ai = 12 (Ai + Ai+1), and the pooling utility function of the
Sender (9) as:
vPi (t) = −
(
t + x − 1
2
(Ai+1 + Ai )
)2
− bPi .
Using vPi (Ai ) = vPi+1(Ai ), it can be shown that the following expression
1
4
(Ai+1 − Ai )2 − (Ai+1 + Ai ) x + bPi
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is independent of i . We denote this constant by c, which allows us to write bPi =
cP(Ai , Ai+1, c) for all i = 1, . . . , N , where
cP (Ai , Ai+1, c) ≡ (Ai+1 + Ai ) x − 1
4
(Ai+1 − Ai )2 + c.
Then, we write vP(t) as follows:
vP (t) = −x2 − 2t x + (Ai+1 − t) (t − Ai ) − c,
Integrating v(t) over t ∈ [0, 1] yields ex-ante expected utility of the Sender V S
given in (4), and (5) is just a non-negativity condition bPi ≥ 0.
Step 2.
The set of partitions of at most N intervals is compact (it is defined by Ai ≤ Ai+1 for




. Indeed, taking c < −2x is not feasible as this would violate cP(A, B, c) ≥ 0,
and taking c > 14 is not optimal since in this case c
P(A, B, c) > 0 and V S decreases
in c. Finally, V S is continuous. Thus, equilibrium ∗ exists. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 In this proof, we use the following lemma, proven inAppendix
B.
Lemma 3 If the Sender burns money in an optimal equilibrium ∗, she does so in
the second interval only, i.e., if bPi > 0 then i = 2.
In the proof of Lemma 3 we show first that if money is burned in two or more
intervals, this equilibrium is suboptimal. Then we show that burning money in inter-
val i ≥ 3 is also suboptimal. Finally, we show the sub-optimality of equilibria where
money is burned in the first interval. In all three statements, we show the sub-optimality
of equilibria by constructing other equilibria that are better from the Sender’s perspec-
tive.
According to Lemma 3, bP1 = 0 and bPi = 0 for i = 3, . . . , n. Hence, A2 ∈ (0, 1]
implicitly defines c by cP(0, A2, c) = 0:
c (A2) = 1
4
A22 − x A2,
Moreover, equalities bPi = 0 for i = 3, . . . , n, define Ai (Ai+1) implicitly and
recursively by cP(Ai , Ai+1, c) = 0. It can be shown by induction that all marginal
states Ai , i = 3, . . . , n, can be written as the following function of A2:




x2 + 2x + c (A2) = 1
2
√
(2x − A2)2 + 8x .
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Thus, choosing A2 ∈ (0, 1] completely determines all othermarginal states Ai (A2).
That is why we can consider Sender’s utility V S = V S() as a function of A2, and
write it as V S(A2), abusing notation slightly.
We prove the proposition in 4 steps. In step 1, we fix the number of intervals
in the partition, n, and show that A2 must satisfy a restriction A2 ∈ [A2, A2). In
step 2, we derive G(A2) ≡ dV Sd A2 and argue that in an optimal equilibrium ∗, either
A2 ∈ (A2, A2) and G(A2) = 0 (interior maximum), or A2 = A2 (corner maximum).
In step 3, we argue that if x is just below xN , the optimal number N∗ of intervals is
N∗ = N , and the maximum is in the interior. This proves part (a) of the proposition.
In step 4, we argue that if x is just above xN , the optimal number of intervals is
N∗ = N + 1, and the maximum is in the interior. This proves part (b).
Step 1.
By choosing A2 ∈ (0, 1], marginal state A3 is A3(A2) = 1 − 2(n − 2)(s(A2) −
(n − 2)x), and the amount of money burned in the second interval is bP2 (A2) =
cP(A2, A3(A2), c(A2)). There are two conditions, namely A3(A2) > A2 and
bP2 (A2) ≥ 0, that have to hold in . These conditions imply A2 < A2 and A2 ≥ A2,
respectively, where
A2 ≡ 2 (n − 1) (xn − x) and A2 ≡ 2 (n − 2) (xn−1 − x) .
Step 2.
Using the above expressions for Ai (A2) and c(A2), we write V S as follows:
V S = −x2 − x + 1
6
(

















A3 (4 (A2 + x) − 3A3) − A2 + 2x
+
(





where d A3d A2 = 12s (N − 2)(2x − A2).
In ∗, V S must attain its maximum over A2 ∈ [A2, A2). If, on the one hand, it
happens at the corner A2 = A2, then bP2 = 0 and the resulting equilibrium is the
cheap talk equilibrium with n intervals. If, on the other hand, the maximum is in the
interior at A2 = A∗2 ∈ (A2, A2), it implies that V S(A∗2) > V S(A2) and, therefore, ∗
yields a strictly higher utility level to the Sender than the cheap talk equilibrium with
n intervals. In this case, the first-order condition is G(A∗2) = 0.
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Step 3.




Suppose x ∈ [xN+1, xN ), such that the most informative cheap talk equilibrium
CT has a partition P(CT) with N intervals of strictly positive lengths. Note that,
A2 > A2 implies xn−1 > x , which together with x ≥ xN+1 implies xn−1 > xN+1.
This yields n ≤ N + 1. Thus, the optimal equilibrium ∗ has at most N + 1 intervals,
i.e., N∗ ≤ N + 1. Let x ∈ [xˆN , xN ) and distinguish three cases.
Suppose, first, n = N + 1 ≥ 4. Then, x ∈ [xˆn−1, xn−1), x > xˆn−1 > xn and A2 <
so that A2 satisfies A2 ∈ [0,A2). It can be shown that G(A2) > for all A2 ∈ [0,A2).
Hence,V S monotonically increases up to A2 = A2,which is the cheap talk equilibrium
with n = N intervals,CT. Thus, n = N +1 is not optimal, and it must be that n ≤ N .
Suppose, second, n = N ≥ 3. Then, x ∈ [xˆn, xn), and A2 ∈ [A2, A2). It can be
shown thatG(A2) > 0 > G(A2) at x = xN andG(A2) < 0 at x = xˆN . By continuity,
there exists a y
N
∈ (xˆN , xN ) such that G(A2) > 0 > G(A2) for all x ∈ (yN , xN ].
This implies, that there exists A∗2 ∈ (A2, A2) which is a local maximum of V S, and at
which bP2 > 0. We note that V
S(A∗2) > V S(A2), where V S(A2) is the Sender’s utility
in CT. Thus, for x ∈ (y
N
, xN ], equilibrium with n = N and A2 = A∗2 is better for
the Sender than CT with N intervals.
Third, suppose n ≤ N −1. In this case, x < xn+1. It can be shown that G(A2) < 0
for all A2 ∈ [A2, A2). Hence, V S monotonically decreases and achieves its maximum
at A2 = A2, the cheap talk equilibrium with n ≤ N − 1 intervals. Thus, all equilibria
with n ≤ N − 1 are dominated by CT and, therefore, are not optimal.
Combining the above three cases, we conclude that if x ∈ (y
N
, xN ], the maximum
is in the interior, A∗2 ∈ (A2, A2), and the number of intervals is N∗ = N .
Step 4.
Let x ∈ [xN+1, xˆN ). As in step 3, we consider tree cases.
Suppose, first, that n = N + 1 ≥ 4. Then, x ∈ [xn, xˆn−1), so that A2≤ 0 and
A2 ∈ [0, A2). It can be shown that G(0) > 0 > G(A2) at x = xN+1 and that
G(A2) > 0 at x = xˆN . By continuity, there exists a yN+1 ∈ (xN+1, xˆN ) such that
G(0) > 0 > G(A2) for all x ∈ [xN+1, yN+1). Hence, there exists A∗2 ∈ (0,A2)which
is a local maximumof V S, and at which bP2 >.We note that V
S(A∗2) > V S(A2), where
V S(A2) is the Sender’s utility in CT. Thus, for x ∈ [xN+1, yN+1), equilibrium with
n = N + 1 and A2 = A∗2 is better for the Sender than CT with N intervals.
Suppose, second, that n ≤ N . In this case, x < xn . It can be shown that G(A2) < 0
for all A2 ∈ [A2, A2). Hence, V S monotonically decreases and achieves its maximum
at A2 = A2, the cheap talk equilibrium with n ≤ N intervals. Thus, of all equilibria
with n ≤ N intervals, CT is the best for the Sender.
Combining the above three cases, we conclude that if x ∈ [xN+1, yN+1), the
maximum is in the interior, A∗2 ∈ (A2, A2), and the number of intervals is N∗ =
N + 1. unionsq
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Remark Proposition 4 provides a sufficient condition for bP2 > 0. The function
V S(A2) has nice analytical properties, and numerical computations show that it is
quasi-concave for all feasible values of A2. Therefore, for x ∈ (yN+1, yN ) and for
x ≥ y4, the sufficient condition for burningmoney, Proposition 4, is also the necessary
condition, implying that ∗ = CT for all x ∈ (yN+1, yN ) and for x ≥ y4. That is,
no money is burned in the Sender-optimal equilibrium for these values of x .
Proof of Proposition 5 We prove the proposition in 4 steps. In step 1, we show that
for this utility specification, all pooling states are convex in any equilibrium. In step
2, we show that when the Sender pools states t ∈ (A, B), the optimal action a of
the Receiver is a = A, the lowest pooling state. In step 3, we show that the money
burning function b(t) is weakly increasing in any equilibrium, and that we only need
to consider equilibria where b(0) = 0. Finally, in step 4, we show that removing one
pooling interval from an equilibrium partition always increases the Sender’s ex-ante
utility, so that, by induction, the optimal equilibrium has an empty partition, i.e., is
perfectly separating.
Step 1.
For the given function uR(a, t), the optimal action for the Receiver is aR(t) = t .
Hence, even though uR(a, t) is not differentiable at a = t (not even continuous),
Lemma 1 of ASB still holds as it only requires aR(t) to be strictly increasing, and,
therefore, so does our Proposition 1. In other word, all pooling states are convex in
any equilibrium.
Step 2.
Let the Receiver get a message sent in a pooling interval (A, B) only. Choosing an
action a ∈ [A, B] yields him the following expected utility:
VR = E
[






(a − t)2 dt + γ (a − A)
)
.
Differentiating V R w.r.t. a yields
d
da
VR = − 1
B − A
(
γ + (a − A)2 − (a − B)2
)
≤ − 1
B − A (γ − 1) < 0.
Thus, choosing the lowest possible a = A is optimal for the Receiver.
Step 3.
The money burning function b(t) obviously increases on separating states t ∈ SS and
is constant on each pooling interval t ∈ (A, B). Since the Sender in state t = A is
indifferent between separating and pooling with states t ∈ (A, B), and the Receiver’s
action in these two options are also equal, the Sender burns equal amounts of money.
Thus, we only need to show that if the Sender in state t = B is indifferent between
separating and pooling with states t ∈ (A, B), the Sender burns more money if she
separates. To this end, we note that when states t ∈ (A, B) pool and burn bP, the
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Sender of type t = B gets utility
vP (B) = u (A, B, x) − bP = − (B + x − A)2 − bP,
By separating, she gets
vS (B) = u (B, B, x) − bS (B) .
vP(B) = vS(B) implies bS(B) − bP = (B − A)((B − A) + 2x) > 0. Thus, b(t) is
increasing, and b(t) ≥ b(0). Obviously, b(0) > 0 is not optimal for the Sender as
lowering b(t) yields her a higher utility. Thus, we only need to consider equilibria
with b(0) = 0.
Step 4.
Let(k) be an equilibriumwith a partition P(k) = P((k)) that contains k > 0 pooling
intervals (k can be infinite here). Let (A, B) ∈ P(k) so that types t ∈ (A, B) pool
in (k). Let us consider an equilibrium (k−1) which partition P(k−1) = P((k−1))
is obtained from P(k) by removing (A, B), i.e., P(k−1) = P(k−1)\{(A, B)}. In states
t ∈ [0, A], v(k) (t) = v(k−1) (t). In states t ∈ (A, B), the utility functions from
pooling (in (k)) and separation (in (k−1)) are:
vP,
(k)
(t) = u (A, t, x) − bP = − (t + x − A)2 − bP,
vS,
(k−1)
(t) = u (t, t, x) − 2x (t − A) − bP = −x2 − 2x (t − A) − bP,
and the difference in utility ϕ(t) is:
ϕ (t) ≡ vS,(k−1) (A) − vP,(k) (t) = (t − A)2 > 0.
Thus, removing a pooling interval (A, B) from P(k) increases utility of all types
t ∈ (A, B) by ϕ(t) > 0. Since the amount of money that the Sender burns in state
t = B in equilibrium (k−1), which is 2x(B − A) + bP, is positive, and b(t) is
increasing, the removal does not result in negative values of b(t) for t > B.
Moreover, in all states t > B, the Sender has to burn ϕ(B) = (B − A)2 less in
(k−1). Thus, the ex-ante expected utility satisfies V(k) < V(k−1) , which ends the
proof. unionsq
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 2 We prove the lemma is 3 steps. In step 1, we derive the ex-ante
expected utility of the Sender V S() in an equilibrium . In step 2, we assume that 
has infinitely many pooling intervals, and construct another equilibrium 1 in which
the Sender pools some of the states which she does not pool in . In step 3, we show
that V S(1) > V S(), so that the original equilibriumwith infinitelymany pooling
intervals is suboptimal. unionsq
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Step 1.
For f (t) = t and u(a, t, x) = −(a − t − x)2, the optimal action of the receiver (8),
the money-burning function for separated states (10), pooling and separating utility
functions (9) and (11) become:
ai = 1
2
(Bi + Ai ) , bS (t) = 2xt +
(
bSi − 2x Bi
)
vPi (t) = −
(
t + x − 1
2
(Bi + Ai )
)2
− bPi , and
vS (t) = −x2 − 2xt −
(
bSi − 2x Bi
)
.
System (12) can now be written as follows:
{
x2 − (ai − Bi − x)2 + bSi = bPi
x2 − (ai − Ai − x)2 + 2x (Ai − Bi−1) + bSi−1 = bPi
,
and then as follows:
{
(Bi + Ai ) x − 14 (Bi − Ai )2 +
(
bSi − 2x Bi
) = bPi
(Bi + Ai ) x − 14 (Bi − Ai )2 +
(
bSi−1 − 2x Bi−1
) = bPi
,
Hence, (bSi − 2x Bi ) is independent of i , which we denote by a new constant c:
(
bSi − 2x Bi
)
= c, for all i.
Consequently, system (12) simplifies to bPi = cP(Ai , Bi , c), where
cP (A, B, c) ≡ (B + A) x − 1
4
(B − A)2 + c.
Themoney-burning function for separated states (10) simplifies to bS(t) = 2xt+c.
Equilibrium utility v(t) can now be written as follows:
v (t) =
{−x2 − 2xt − c + (Bi − t) (t − Ai ) if t ∈ (Ai , Bi )
−x2 − 2xt − c if t ∈ (Bi , Ai+1)
Integrating v(t) over t ∈ [0, 1] yields the ex-ante expected utility of the Sender:




(Bi − Ai )3 . (17)
In (17), the summation extends on all pooling intervals, be they finite or infinite in
numbers.
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Step 2.
Let P() be an infinite partition. The set ofmarginal states {Ai } is infinite and has an
accumulation point Aˆ. It follows that for any ε > 0, there are infinitely many marginal
states either in a right neighborhood ( Aˆ, Aˆ + ε) or a left neighborhood ( Aˆ − ε, Aˆ) of
Aˆ. We consider the first possibility; the second case can be dealt with similarly.
Let us take an ε ∈ (0, 4x) and choose two marginal states An1 and An2 such that
An1 < An2 and {An1, An2} ⊂ ( Aˆ, Aˆ + ε). In , if the state is t = Ai , the Sender
is indifferent between pooling with the states t ∈ (Ai , Bi ) or separating. In the latter
case, she burns bS(Ai ) = 2x Ai + c. By continuity of the equilibrium utility function









) = u( Aˆ, Aˆ, x) − bS( Aˆ) = −x2 − 2x Aˆ − c,
where the limit is taken over any decreasing subsequence of {Aik } that converges to
Aˆ. Accordingly, V S() can be written as follows.


















Let us now consider an equilibrium 1 with a partition P(1) in which all states
t ∈ ( Aˆ, An2) are pooled, and in all other states, the Sender sends the same signal as
she does in , i.e.,
P (1) =
{
(Ai , Bi ) | (Ai , Bi )∩
(
Aˆ, An2
) = ∅}∪ {( Aˆ, An2
)}
.
In 1, if the state is t ∈ ( Aˆ, An2), the Sender burns:
bP1 (t) = cP
(
Aˆ, An2 , c























4x − ε) > 0.
Thus, constructing 1 is always feasible. In 1, the sender gets utility V S(1):
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Step 3.
Let us evaluate the difference V S(1) − V S() is:

















)3 − (An1 − Aˆ
)3 − (An2 − An1
)3)
> 0.
Thus,  is suboptimal. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 3 We prove the lemma is 4 steps. In step 1, we show that it is never
optimal to burn money in two neighboring intervals i and (i + 1). In step 2, we show
that neither is it optimal to burn money in two intervals even if there are some pooling
intervals without money burning in between. Steps 1 and 2 together imply that the
Sender burns money in at most one interval in ∗. In step 3, we show that it is not
optimal to burn money in the first interval, and in step 4, we show that neither is it
optimal to burn money in an interval j ≥ 3. The statement of the lemma then follows
immediately.
Step 1.
We prove by contradiction. Suppose that in ∗ money burning take place in two
neighboring intervals i and (i+1), so that cP(Ai , Ai+1, c) > and cP(Ai+1, Ai+2, c) >
0. We consider a small change in Ai+1 for which the last two inequalities still hold,
and consider utility V S = V S() as a function of Ai+1. The necessary conditions
for a local maximum are dV
S
d Ai+1 = 0 and d
2V S
d A2i+1
≤ 0. However, the objective function is
convex in Ai+1, d
2V S
d A2i+1
= (Ai+2 − Ai ) > 0, contradicting the optimality of ∗.
Step 2.
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that in ∗, money burning takes place in two
intervals (k−n−1) and k, k ≥ 3, i.e., there are n ≥ 1 pooling intervals without money
burning in between two intervals where money burning takes place. Thus, bPk > 0,
bPk−n−1 > 0, and bPi = 0 for all i = (k − n), . . . , (k − 1). We construct another
equilibrium 1 such that V S(1) > V S(∗), which contradicts the optimality of ∗.
We consider a family of equilibria  which have the same value of c, the same
marginal states below Ak−n and above Ak , i.e., in the set [0, Ak−n−1] ∪ [Ak+1, 1],
and no money burning in the set (Ak−n, Ak). It is easy to see that the choice of Ak
uniquely defines Ai for i = (k − n), . . . , (k − 1) through bPi = cP(Ai , Ai+1, c) as
follows:
Ai = Ai+1 − 2
(√
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By induction on i , it can be shown that this recursive equation implies:10
Ak− j = Ak − 2 j (s (Ak, c) − j x) for j = 1, . . . , n, (18)
where we have defined
s (A, c) ≡
√
x2 + 2x A + c.
The lengths of the intervals Di = (Ai+1 − Ai ) can be written as follows:
Dk− j = Ak− j+1 − Ak− j = 2 (s (Ak, c) − (2 j − 1) x) , for j = 1, . . . , n.
The constraints cP(Ai , Ai+1, c) = 0 imply that for j = 1, . . . , n:
D3k− j = 4x
(
A2k− j+1 − A2k− j
) + 4c (Ak− j+1 − Ak− j
)
. (19)
In what follows, we consider V S = V S() as a function of Ak :





In the rest of step 2,we show thatV S() is convex in Ak so that an interiormaximum
does not exist. The maximum necessarily violates one of the restrictions Dk−n−1 >,
Dk > 0, bPk > 0, or b
P
k−n−1 > 0. Consequently, in any open neighborhood of Ak ,
there exists an A˜k and the corresponding equilibrium 1 so that V S(1) > V S(∗).























D3k− j + D3k
⎞
⎠ .




























3D2k−n−1 − 8x Ak−n − 4c
) d Ak−n
d Ak
+ 8x Ak + 4c − 3D2k
)
.
10 The necessary condition for the induction is that s(A, c) − 2nx > 0. When it fails, Ak− j does not exist
for some j = 1, . . . , n. Note that given our assumption that bPi = 0 for i = (k − n), . . . , (k − 1) this
condition holds.
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= 1 − 2n ds (Ak, c)
d Ak





































3s2 (Ak, c) −
(
4n2 − 1) x2)
3s3 (Ak, c)
.








) (3(2n − 1)2 − (4n2 − 1)) = 16x





Hence, V S is strictly convex in Ak .
Step 3.
Suppose that N = 1 so that P() = {(0, 1)}. Clearly, the Sender prefers an
equilibrium with bP1 = 0 over one with bP1 > 0. Suppose, therefore, that N ≥ 2, and
bP1 > 0 and b
P
i = 0 for all i = 2, . . . , N . Using bPi = 0, we write c and Ai as functions
of AN through (18):
c (AN ) = 1
4
(1 − AN )2 − (1 + AN ) x, and
Ai (AN ) = 1 − (N + 1 − i) ((1 − AN ) − 2 (N − i) x) for i = 2, . . . , N . (21)
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In what follows, we consider V S = V S() as a function of AN . Using (19) yields












= (N − 1)
(
3A22 − 8x A2 − (1 − AN )2 + 4x (1 + AN )
) − (2 (1 − A2) − 3) ((1 − AN ) + 2x)
6
.
In the rest of step 3, we show that dV
S
d AN
> 0 so that V S is strictly increasin in AN
and, therefore,  is not optimal. Using (21), we express AN it in terms of A2:
AN = A2
N − 1 − 2 (N − 2) x +
N − 2
N − 1 .
Then, we express dV
S
d AN
in terms of A2:
dV S
d AN
(A2) = N − 1
6
(
3A2 (1 + A2 (N − 2) N )
(N − 1)2 + 2x (3 − (N − 2) 2Nx)
)
.
Next, we define Aˆ implicitly by cP( Aˆ, A2, c) = 0:
Aˆ ≡ 1 − N ((1 − AN ) − 2 (N − 1) x) = 1 − N
(
1 − A2





∂A = x + B−A2 > 0, and bP1 = c
P
(0, A2, c) > 0 by our assumption, it must
be the case that Aˆ < 0, which is equivalent to 2Nx < NN−1 (1 − A2) − 1. Hence,
3 − (N − 2) 2Nx > 3 − (N − 2)
(
N
N − 1 (1 − A2) − 1
)
= (2N − 1) + (N − 2) N A2




(AN ) > 0. This ends step 3.
Step 4.
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that in ∗, money burning only takes place
in interval (k + 1), k ≥ 2, i.e., bPk+1 > 0 and bPi = 0 for i = 1, . . . , k. We construct
another equilibrium1 such that V S(1) > V S(∗), which contradicts the optimality
of ∗.
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Conditions bPi−1 = 0 for i = 2, . . . , k+1 determine parameter c and all equilibrium
marginal states Ai as functions of A2:
c (A2) = 1
4
A22 − x A2, and Ai (A2) = (i − 1) (2x (i − 2) + A2) .





Let us consider an equilibrium 1 with the same marginal states as in ∗ except
for Ak+1. In 1 we take Ak+1 = A˜k+1 where A˜k+1 is implicitly defined by
cP( A˜k+1, Ak+2, c) = 0. In other words, we take
A˜k+1 = Ak+2 − 2
(√
x2 + 2x Ak+2 + c − x
)
.
In the rest of step 4, we show (a) that A˜k+1 ∈ (Ak, Ak+1) and cP(Ak, A˜k+1, c) > 0
so that the construction of 1 is feasible, and (b) that:
H≡ 6
(
V S (1) − V S ()
)
> 0,
so that ∗ is suboptimal.
(a) We fix the value of Ak+1, use notation v ≡ Dk+2 = (Ak+2 − Ak+1) > 0,
and consider Ak+2 as a function of v, i.e., Ak+2(v) = Ak+1 + v. Similarly, we
consider functions
A˜k+1 (v) = Ak+2 (v) − 2
(√
x2 + 2x Ak+2 (v) + c − x
)
, and
D˜k+1 (v) ≡ Ak+2 (v) − A˜k+1 (v) = 2
(√
x2 + 2x Ak+2 (v) + c − x
)
.
Let us consider the function A˜k+1(v). First, we define a number vˆ implicitly
by cP(Ak+1, Ak+1 + vˆ, c) = 0. Since cP(A, B, c) is a second-degree concave
polynomial in B and:
cP (Ak+1, Ak+1, c) = 2x Ak+1 + c = 4x2k (k − 1) + (2k − 1) x A2 + 1
4
A22 > 0,
it follows that cP(Ak+1, Ak+1 + v, c) > 0 for all v ∈ (0, vˆ) by construction.
Second, A˜k+1(0) = Ak due to bPk = 0, and A˜k+1(vˆ) = Ak+1 by the definition
of vˆ. Third, we show that A˜k+1(v) is monotonically increasing on v ∈ (0, vˆ),




= 1 − 2x√
x2 + 2x Ak+2 + c
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d D˜k+1
dv





Since D˜k+1(0) = 4kx + A2 > 2x , it follows that D˜k+1(v) > 2x and d A˜k+1dv > 0.
(b) The contribution of intervals (Ak, A˜k+1) and ( A˜k+1, Ak+2) into the objective
V˜ S is 16 (( A˜k+1 − Ak)3 + (Ak+2 − A˜k+1)3). Hence, H ≡ 6(V˜ S − V S) can be
written as:


















Thus, ∗ is suboptimal, which ends the proof of part (b), step 4, and the whole
lemma. unionsq
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